More video of the Next Gen weapon systems


Look at how handy and smooth shooting these samples are.

I’ve wondered if the Big Army is really looking for a new DMR/LMG round and claiming that they are looking for a new general purpose rifle for funding or what ever excuse reason they need.


  1. “Look at how handy and smooth shooting these samples are.

    I’ve wondered if the Big Army is really looking for a new DMR/LMG round and claiming that they are looking for a new general purpose rifle for funding or what ever excuse reason they need.”

    I really don’t know if that actually makes sense–If they wanted a better DMR/LMG round, then what they need to do is specify something that’s superior to the 7.62 NATO, not this 6.8 abortion that’s basically a recap of the 7.62 design process that resulted in an inferior LMG round that was uncontrollable on full-auto in the individual weapon.

    Of course, precisely none of this really makes a lick of fucking sense whatsoever, but that’s just me.

    We’d probably be better off analyzing this by the post-retirement employment opportunities offered by the various competitors, and handicapping the likely winner based on that criteria. Whoever can employ the most senior officers will likely “win” the competition…

    The real problem with our small arms suite isn’t the weapons or the cartridges themselves. Those are adequate–What’s lacking is on the “software” end of things, doctrine and training. We really lack a conceptual framework for discussing or thinking about what the small arms are supposed to be doing for us, tactically. If you disbelieve me, go out and ask the average 2LT in one of the combat arms what the hell he’s supposed to be using his riflemen and DMRs for, and how they are supposed to integrate the various other sources of firepower into their tactics and operations. Most will be unable to really articulate anything at all coherent, and will demonstrate a near-total lack of an ability to comprehend why they’d even need to do so. You’ll find that most of their senior leaders are in the same boat.

    Tactics and operational intent need to drive weapons design when you’re at the point we are with the technology. You don’t want to spend the money to equip your forces with complex weapons whose expense you’ll never see the benefit from, nor do you want to have a situation where the weapons are inadequate for your state of training and professionalism. The key issue is “How do I intend to fight?”.

    The Germans before WWII looked at things, realized they were lacking the trained manpower to fill their reserves as they did before WWI, and chose to essentially distill the question of firepower into their machine gun designs and doctrine. The MG34 and 42 were near-perfect tools to implement their doctrinal choice to maximize the benefit of their trained manpower–The squad was built around the guns, and the whole thing was manageable by the limited trained and proficient leadership they had to work with. Which was why they did what they did–Weapons design driven by tactical and operational choices. When the conditions changed, then so did the weapons–Which was why the StG44 got designed the way it did, and why it reached production. It was not a case of “weapon first, then tactics…”.

    Which was the mistake we keep on making here in the US. The Garand was designed and issued in a vacuum, with some vague idea of dispersed firepower and the power of the individual rifleman being able to trump everything else on the battlefield. That idea was never tested or validated in combat until the early 1960s, when we ran into the Soviet small arms complex in Vietnam. Before that, our supporting arms always managed to succeed in winning the fight for us, masking the failure of our theories about small arms. This failure wasn’t apparent until we got into the close terrain of Vietnam, and discovered that when the fight was restricted to small arms, our ideas about how war was fought were entirely delusional.

    Tactics and operational intent first, then weapons design. I repeat that to make the point that none of this NGSW crap lays out the changes in tactics and operational factors that the new weapons will enable and/or necessitate. If neither will change, then what the hell are we spending the money for?

    I submit that it would be a lot smarter to improve training and doctrine, particularly with regards to the ROE, and then only change the small arms once we’re absolutely certain we’re exploiting their potential to the fullest. I know for a fact that an awful lot of the problems with our MG systems stem from inadequate training and piss-poor support in terms of things like tripods, binos, and rangefinders being actually issued to the troops. Fix that, and if we still have problems? Then blow the bucks on the new weapons. Until they’ve done that, I remain highly dubious of this entire proposition.

    I’m pretty sure that NGSW is going to go away once Milley retires.


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