We have another guest post from Mr. Trey Moore of  Mooremilitaria.  Moore’s has a huge selection of  very exact reproduction Vietnam war clothing and rare camo along with original field gear and other items. He has about anything you would want if you like Vietnam war items, including PAVN and VC forces gear. Mooremilitaria is a friend of looseorunds.com and has shared his excellent article on the XM16 and M16 history. You can visit his great website and find some of the very best Vietnam  gear around. SO good most of the Vietnam war gear you see in movies and TV is from Him.

http://www.mooremilitaria.com/index.html

Development

In 1958, the United States military evaluated two prototypes being considered as a new standard issue infantry rifle. One of the requirements identified as centrally important for the new rifle was reduced weight. A lightweight rifle would allow soldiers to carry more equipment, supplies, and ammunition. Just as the new designs were being evaluated, the U.S. Army’s Continental Army Command compiled and eventually published two combat studies from both world wars to help shape the requirements for the new rifle. One of the more compelling statistics from this study revealed that 2/3 of soldiers in combat never fired their weapons and that the vast majority of firefights occurred at close range and commenced as “surprise” encounters, especially in a tropical environments. Assuming that the low-intensity conflict South East Asia would continue to escalate, the Continental Army Command recognized that a lightweight rifle firing a small caliber, high velocity cartridge would be the ideal weapon for the coming jungle war. Of the two prototypes submitted to the U.S. Army’s Infantry Board for evaluation, the ArmaLite AR15, which was based on an earlier design by Eugene M. Stoner stood out early on as the better gun.

Weapons Testing and Reception

In 1961, General Curtis Emerson LeMay is made the fifth Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force and, shortly thereafter, he placed an order for 80,000 AR15′s for U.S. Air Force security forces. However, the President John F. Kennedy’s administration refused the order on the grounds that it the logistical challenges associated with having two different rifle calibers – 7.62x51mm and 5.56x45mm – in use by the U.S. military at the same time would be too great. As the conflict in South East Asia continued to grow, the U.S. sent 10 AR15s to Vietnam for testing and evaluation in early 1962. Soldiers using the AR15 quickly praised the rifle’s effectiveness in combat. In response, the US sent more rifles for South Vietnamese Special Forces unites. Soldiers using the weapon, again, offered unreserved praise for the stopping power of the rifle’s 5.56x45mm cartridge.

Although the AR15 received great accolade for its performance in battle, what no one knew outside of the men using it was that the wounds the rifle produced were ghastly – so much so that the photographs showing these wounds remained classified until 1980. The source of the rifle’s destructive power was not so much the 55g 5.56mm bullet it fired, but the pitch of the rifle’s barrel’s rifling.  The 1 in 14 twist rate of the rifling produced sufficient ballistic stability to get the bullet to a target, but on impact with that target, the bullet tended to tumble end over end. Although the 1 in 14 twist rifling produced devastating lethality, it did not produce satisfactory accuracy in cold temperatures. In July of 1963, Secretary McNamara approved the Air Force’s request to change the rifling twist to 1 in 12. The main theory being that the increased probability of a hit outweighed the higher chance of a kill resulting from that hit

Final Stages of Development: M16 vs XM16E1

As the shortcomings of the M14 rifle’s design became more thoroughly understood, more attention was shifted to the new AR15 rifle. The Kennedy Administration and other officials began to push for a “modern” rifle and the AR15 provided the clear answer. With the change to the 1 in 12 twist rate having been already made, the U.S. Air Force’s plans to adopt the AR15 began to move forward swiftly. The Army however, was still dragging its feet and looking for ways to challenge the adoption of the new rifle. The Army insisted on the installation of a bolt closure device so that the troops would have the ability to manually close the bolt on a rifle in the event of a malfunction.  Manual bolt closure had been a part of the design of every U.S. service rifle since the M1903 Springfield, and the Army was not about to give up on it now. Both the Air Force and Eugene Stoner insisted that the rifle did not require a bolt closure device and pointed out that there had been no failures in testing that would have been remedied by the addition of the device. The Air Force stood fast on the fact that the bolt closure device was unneeded while the Marine Corps and Navy sided with the Army in recognition of the device being potentially useful.

By October of 1963, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Strange McNamara had no choice but to recognize that the service branches would not all agree on the change and that there would not be a single model of the rifle. Soon thereafter, Contract 508, which was valued at $13.5 million, was issued to Colt on November 4, 1963. The contract was for 104,000 rifles. 85,000 rifles with the bolt closure device (forward assist) would be for delivery to the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps. These were designated XM16E1 rifle (Experimental M16, change one – the addition of the forward assist). The remaining 19,000 rifles would be delivered to the Air Force and did not have the bolt closure device. They were designated as the M16. The only difference between the two models was the the bolt closure device, and the roll marked name designation on the receiver. Delivery of these rifles began in March of 1964.

The Army’s rifles were delivered to elite units including Special Forces, the 101st Airborne Division, the 82nd Airborne Division and the newly formed 1st Cavalry Division. Early use in Vietnam and the 82nd Airborne Division’s use of the weapon in the Dominican Republic indicated that the design was a great success. In July 1965, General Westmoreland asked that a logistical study be conducted to evaluate the possibility of expanding the adoption of the new rifle to such an extent that it would be issued to every U.S. serviceman in Vietnam. In the Fall he advocated ordering 100,000 new rifles. The low recoil, light weight, and impressive rate of fire of the 5.56mm XM16E1 was perfect for the jungles of Vietnam. However, the quick success and immediate need for more rifles would soon lead to problems.

Mistakes and Casualties

With an increase in demand for rifles came an increase in demand for ammunition, which would ultimately cause a series of notorious failures that would plague the M16′s reputation for decades to come. Ammunition manufacturers were struggling with the requirements specified by the technical data package for the M193 cartridge (the official designation for the M16′s 5.56mm ammunition). High gas port pressures, chamber pressures, and cyclic rates of fire, along with arguments over the bullet’s shape initially led all approved ammunition manufacturers to decline bidding on the contract. However, an agreement was eventually reached and DuPont produced CR8136 powder (commonly referred to as stick or tube) and Olin Mathieson produced WC846 powder (commonly referred to as ball powder). This initially satisfied the Army by keeping with the concept of having two approved yet different powders to compensate for shortages, manufacturing problems, etc. However, in reality, DuPont could not meet consistent pressure measurements for the ammunition which resulted in the first 18 months of ammunition production using the WC846 powder almost exclusively.

By September of 1965 evidence and testing clearly indicated that the WC846 powder caused a higher cyclic rate and was more prone to fouling. In fact, the 15th Memo Report on the XM16E1 system stated “the control propellant, WC846 though otherwise satisfactory, does produce quantities of fouling…sufficient to affect weapon function if the weapon is not cleaned after firing a maximum or 1,000 cartridges… that [Olin] be encouraged to modify their propellant.” However, the rifle continued to fair well in Vietnam, primarily as a result of the training that soldiers in elite units had received.

In the summer of 1966, the new rifle began replacing the M14 in all U.S. Army combat arms units – soon, “everyone” would have the XM16E1 rifle. Many units received them in-country with very little attention paid to training the soldier on the care and maintenance of the new rifle. A shortage of cleaning kits, a total lack of a chamber brush, shortcomings in training, and ammunition that created fouling problems soon led to failures in combat that ultimately resulted in a Congressional Investigation, the Ichord Committee, in 1967.

By late 1966/early 1967, chamber brushes, bore brushes, and a swab holder for the new 4 piece cleaning rod were on order. Maintenance cards were printed and circulated to help instruct soldiers on the care of their new rifle. While necessary, it would still take months to get these items into the field. In the late 60′s, the Army turned to artist Will Eisner of Mad Magazine to help illustrate maintenance comics. Anything that could be done to help a soldier care for his rifle would be done.

Revisions and a New Generation

The XM16E1 rifle had many small changes during its development, but there were 10 primary engineering changes that took place before the reclassification of the rifle as “Standard A” and its eventual designation as the M16A1 in February of 1967. The gas tube, buffer, bolt hardness, bolt carrier key finish, firing pin retainer, bolt catch, disconnector, and flashider were all modified, and a raised fence area was added around the magazine release to help prevent hitting the release unintentionally. A chrome plated chamber would eventually be added to the revision list in May of 1967.

While these changes enhanced the rifle’s performance and reliability in the field, they did not address the heart of the issue. The “failure to eject” stoppages were primarily being caused by the change in powder type from a stick propellant, to ball propellant. This switch achieved the desired muzzle velocity of 3,300fps, but it increased the cyclic rate of fire from 850 rounds per minute to 1,000 rounds. This caused poor case extraction as a result of prematurely opening the bolt, and it increased fouling in the rifle in both the gas system and chamber. The main culprit, the ball propellant, would not have its formula adjusted and re-designated as WC844 until January of 1970.

With design improvements, a chrome chamber, reformulated powder, and proper training for soldiers in the field on the use and maintenance of the rifle, reliability improved quickly – as did morale. A testament to the legacy of the M16 series if the M16A4 currently in use the U.S. Marine Corps and the M4 Carbine in use by the US Army. 50 years after is adoption by the U.S. Military, the M16 family is still soldiering on as the longest serving US rifle.

Today we have another guest post from Andrew Betts about using ball ammo  inside your home.

This article is the opinion of Andrew but not necessarily the opinion or philosophy of the owners of looseorunds.com. 

Everybody knows that ball ammo penetrates too deeply to be considered for defense, right? Full metal jacket doesn’t expand or fragment so it transfers little energy to the target and just zips on through, leaving wounds that may take some time to incapacitate and representing a not insignificant danger to people down range. This problem only gets worse in a rifle. At least that’s what any self-anointed gun counter “expert” will tell you.

Except that this concept is demonstrably false. To be fair, it is true that FMJ is a poor choice in handgun calibers for exactly the reasons outlined above. It is also true for many rifle loads. There are certain .223/5.56mm FMJ loads than can fragment and some do so very reliably. Copper jacketed 55 gr bullets with an open base and a cannelure (the notched portion around the circumference of the bullet at the point it meets the case mouth) are particularly good at fragmenting. They fragment so reliably that there is no reason not to consider them as a viable defense option.

When a .223/5.56mm bullet fragments, it transfers a LOT of energy into the target very quickly. This energy results in the formation of a very large temporary stretch cavity. At handgun velocities, this stretch cavity is small enough that it does not exceed the elastic limits of human tissue. Think of it like a rubber band. No damage is done to the rubber band, even if you stretch it far past its original length. At a certain point, though, the rubber band can stretch no further and will snap. Just before this happens, the rubber band is also much more vulnerable to tiny cuts than it would be when relaxed. A similar effect is seen when the fragments of a high velocity bullet pass through human tissue. The tissues stretch far enough to begin tearing and the multitude of fragments cause even more dramatic tearing, leaving a surprisingly large and devastating wound. At the same time, these fragments are each slowed individually by the tissues and the entire mass of the bullet is stopped much more quickly than it would have if it stayed together.

Take a look at this video and reconsider whether FMJ penetrates too deeply. Also, a pressurized can full of fruit can eject the contents forcibly enough to act like a rocket, but that’s another story.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gqqZK6rrjA8

While ball ammo can fragment it is highly dependent on velocity and construction of the bullet and jackets and other factors. Some will work wonderfully, while others fail to frag in any way.  Ball ammo does have many uses but looserounds highly advises you to use proper expanding bullets for self defense unless you absolutely have no other choice or need something with serious penetration capabilities. In addition to its other short comings, if accuracy is essential for your use, ball ammo is not going to deliver. Editor

https://looserounds.files.wordpress.com/2014/10/103358292.pdf

I bought a Colt 6945.  Why?  Because I wanted one.  Good enough reason for me.

I ordered the rifle Feburary from Gun Gallery.  In September the tax stamp finally came back from the ATF and I picked it up.  The staff at Gun Gallery were friendly and helpful, so I would purchase from them again.

The Colt 6945 is a short barreled rifle (SBR) version of the Colt 6940.  This rifles 10.3 inch barrel is the main difference from the standard 6940, and is why it is a title II firearm which required me to pay a $200 dollar tax stamp to get it.

The 6940 series of rifles have a monolithic upper with a removable bottom rail.  The barrel uses a proprietary barrel extension and gas tube.  Shawn and others have reported that their 6940s have superb accuracy due to these changes.  Personally I don’t plan to try and use this as a precision rifle, so its no difference to me.

The best thing about a short barreled AR15 is the pure modularity of it.  I can easily swap upper for various barrel lengths and calibers.

So I really like my 6945.

Since getting it I have run six different uppers on it.  That is one of the great things about a SBR AR15 is the ability to easily change the uppers for difference barrel lengths and calibers.  I also swapped out the stock trigger for a Geissele Super 3 Gun trigger.

I have several Geissele SSA triggers and I highly recommend them.  I wanted to try the Super 3 Gun (S3G) trigger, so I picked one up a while back.  First it was installed in a LMT lower, where it would often double & rarely fail to reset after a shot was fired.  So it was quickly removed from that lower(I have had other issues with that lower before).  When the got the Colt, I went and tried the S3G trigger in it.  Now in the Colt, the S3G trigger worked fine when shooting offhand or from the bench.  However due to the very short reset, when I was firing from a bipod I experienced unintentional doubles.  This trigger might be great for someone who wants to bump fire, but the reset is a little too short for me.  I wouldn’t recommend the S3G for any serious fighting rifles, but I do recommend the Geissele SSA and the Colt 6945 as they are awesome.

The Gun
By C. J. Chivers

A book review by Loose Rounds Guest Writer Andrew Betts

That the Kalashnikov series of rifles and light machineguns has had a profound impact on geopolitics is indisputable. It has been manufactured and distributed in such large numbers that in many places in the world the word “Kalashnikov” (or local slang for the AK) is literally synonymous with “gun.” While the influence of the gun is well known, there is much about the origin of Kalashnikov’s rifle that is misunderstood. The Gun tells us the story of how the Kalashnikov family of weapons came into existence and it gives us fascinating insight into the ways in which it continues to shape the world in which we live.

Chivers begins with a detailed history of the development of automatic arms and their influence on the battlefield. He tells us about some of the attempts at automatic and repeating arms before the advent of the Gatling gun and then he examines in great detail the life of Richard J. Gatling as well as the development of the weapon itself. We get to see fascinating detail about how the arms business of the 19th century worked and we move on to accounts of the use of Gatling’s gun on the battlefield. We are treated to similar detail about the Maxim machine gun and its own creator as well as its influence on the battlefield. The author then takes us on to an account of Mikhail Timofeyevich Kalashnikov’s life and the development of his namesake and its influence.

The story of how the Kalashnikov rifle came into being is not as simple as it first appears. The rifle was a symbol of socialist power and ability. It was inevitable that its origins would be obscured by propaganda. The Soviet Union embellished bits here and there and created total fabrications in other places. The author sifts through the propaganda, public record, and personal accounts to get to the core of what really happened. He takes great pains to unravel the truth by weighing accounts from multiple sources and he painstakingly cites every bit of information. This book is not simply a collection of the author’s opinions, it is a professionally researched factual account.

Chivers provides incredible detail into the lives of Gatling, Maxim, and Kalashnikov and he is just as meticulous in his account of the development and influence of each of those weapons. There are some glaring holes, though. While it would not be practical for the author to cover every automatic weapon between World War I and the end of World War II, it seems reasonable that he spend a little more time on one of the most influential weapons of the time: the US Rifle M1. The Garand is barely even mentioned, nor is the Johnson. The Simonov carbine and the SVT are also only mentioned in passing. The Thompson and other sub machine guns are mentioned but little detail is given. With so much attention given to the Gatling and Maxim, it seems odd to give such short shrift to some of the other notable self loading designs contemporaneous to Kalashnikov’s work.

Later, the author details the absolutely horrid tale of the adoption and fielding of the M16. He pulls no punches. The decisions made at the time were criminally negligent and we see an account of this process at a level of detail seldom seen. The M16 was a failure because of terrible bureaucratic decisions, though, not because of any inherent design flaw. The issues that caused the early failures were eventually corrected and the rifle developed into a durable and dependable combat rifle. In real field environments, Eugene Stoner’s rifle is every bit as reliable as Kalashnikov’s. The author gives us an accurate account of the reasons for the M16’s early troubles but he leaves us at the end of the M16’s birth pains. If the reader had no context, he might believe that the M16 continued to be a terrible rifle.

This book is about the Kalashnikov rifle, though. We can forgive the author for not spending much time on other weapon systems. It is disappointing, then, that the technical discussion of the Kalashnikov ends with the AKM. The author could have given us far more detail about the technical specifications of the various types of ammunition fired in Kalashnikov pattern rifles and machineguns and he definitely could have provided more detail about models such as the AK-74 and RPK. The AK-74 especially deserves substantial attention because it is still the primary issued rifle for several nations. It is barely mentioned and we are not treated to any details of the decision process or the reasons for the development of the 5.45x39mm or the changes that went into the AK-74 rifle.

It is easy to be critical, though. It is far more difficult to do the intensive research and talented writing that goes into a book of this scope. It is a detailed and far reaching story of automatic arms in general and the Kalashnikov rifle in particular. It is entertaining and engaging. The author’s style is such that he is able to communicate a great deal of information without ever losing the reader’s interest. Most of all, though, it is extremely enlightening. It is very unlikely that anyone can read this book and not learn something. For anyone remotely interested in firearms, this is definitely worth your time.

http://www.amazon.com/Gun-C-J-Chivers/dp/0743271734/ref=la_B003OI2BIE_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1412732686&sr=1-1